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Abstract
This paper argues that a broad class of search models cannot generate the observed
business-cycle-frequency ﬂuctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response
to shocks of a plausible magnitude. In the U.S., the vacancy-unemployment ratio
is 20 times as volatile as average labor productivity, while under weak assumptions,
search models predict that the vacancy-unemployment ratio and labor productivity
have nearly the same variance.
I establish this claim both using analytical comparative statics in a very general
deterministic search model and using simulations of a stochastic version of the model. I
show that a shock that changes average labor productivity primarily alters the present
value of wages, generating only a small movement along a downward sloping Beveridge
curve (unemployment-vacancy locus). A shock to the job destruction rate generates
a counterfactually positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies. In both
cases, the shock is only slightly ampliﬁed and the model exhibits virtually no propaga-
tion. I reconcile these ﬁndings with an existing literature and argue that the source of
the model’s failure is lack of wage rigidity, a consequence of the assumption that wages
are determined by Nash bargaining.
∗This is a major revision of ‘Equilibrium Unemployment Fluctuations’. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Olivier
Blanchard, V. V. Chari, Joao Gomes, Robert Hall, Dale Mortensen, Christopher Pissarides, Richard Roger-
son, and numerous other seminar participants for comments. This material is based upon work supported
by the National Science Foundation under grant number 0079345. I am grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan Foun-
dation for ﬁnancial support, to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for its hospitality while I revised a
previous version of this paper, and to Mihai Manea and especially Sebastian Ludmer for excellent research
assistance.1 Introduction
In recent years, the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model has become
the standard theory of equilibrium unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994,
Pissarides 2000). The model is attractive for a number of reasons: it oﬀers an ap-
pealing description of how the labor market functions; it is analytically tractable; it
has rich and generally intuitive comparative statics; and it can easily be adapted to
study a number of labor market policy issues, such as unemployment insurance, ﬁring
restrictions, and mandatory advanced notiﬁcation of layoﬀs. Given these successes,
one might expect that there would be strong evidence that the model is consistent
with key business cycle facts. On the contrary, I argue in this paper that the model
cannot explain the cyclical behavior of two of its central elements, unemployment and
vacancies. In U.S. data, both are highly variable and strongly negatively correlated.
I focus on two sources of shocks, changes in labor productivity and changes in the
job destruction rate. In a one sector model, a change in labor productivity is most easily
interpreted as a technology or supply shock. But in a multi-sector model, a preference
or demand shock changes the relative price of goods, which induces a change in real
labor productivity as well (Hall 2003). Thus these shocks represent a broad set of
possible impulses.
An increase in labor productivity relative to the value of non-market activity and
to the cost of advertising a job vacancy makes unemployment relatively expensive
and vacancies relatively cheap.1 The market substitutes towards vacancies, and the
increased job creation pulls down the unemployment rate, moving the economy along
a downward sloping Beveridge curve (unemployment-vacancy locus). But the increase
in job creation shortens unemployment duration, raising workers’ threat point in wage
bargaining, and therefore raising the present value of wages in new jobs. Higher wages
absorb most of the productivity increase, eliminating the incentive for vacancy creation.
As a result, ﬂuctuations in labor productivity have little impact on the unemployment
or vacancy rates.
An increase in the job destruction rate does not aﬀect the relative price of un-
employment and vacancies, and so leaves the vacancy-unemployment ratio essentially
unchanged. Since the increase in job destruction reduces employment duration, the
unemployment rate increases, and so therefore must vacancies. As a result, ﬂuctua-
tions in the job destruction rate induce a counterfactually positive correlation between
unemployment and vacancies.
1The interpretation in this paragraph and its sequel builds on discussions with Robert Hall.
1I establish the model’s inability to generate realistic ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and vacancies in several steps. Section 2 presents the relevant business cycle facts:
unemployment is strongly countercyclical, vacancies are equally strongly procyclical,
and the correlation between the two variables is −0.9 at business cycle frequencies.
I also show that the magnitude of ﬂuctuations in the vacancy-unemployment ratio
is large, with the ratio frequently rising or falling by 100 percent or more within a
few years. On the other hand, average labor productivity is much more stable, rarely
moving by more than 5 percent during the business cycle. These facts have been noted
before, and so I focus my attention on an attempt to convince the reader that they
are not measurement artifacts, but rather represent a real phenomenon that should be
explained.
In Section 3, I perform comparative statics in a search and matching model with
rich microeconomic heterogeneity but no aggregate uncertainty and no discounting. I
allow individual productivity to follow an arbitrary stochastic process and I do not
impose constant returns to scale on the matching function. I make only two critical
assumptions: wages are determined by Nash bargaining, at least when a worker and
ﬁrm ﬁrst meet; and a free entry condition determines the number of vacancies. The
model has four critical parameters: average labor productivity ¯ p,t h ev a l u eo fn o n -
market activity z, the cost of maintaining an open vacancy c, and workers’ bargaining
power in wage negotiations β. I show that for a ﬁxed value of the bargaining parameter,
the vacancy-unemployment ratio is nearly proportional to
¯ p−z
c , where the constant of
proportionality depends on β. In particular, unless the percentage diﬀerence between
average labor productivity and the value of non-market activity is small, so it does
not much matter whether individuals work in the market, moderate movements in
average labor productivity, in the value of non-market activity, or in the cost of a
vacancy cannot generate even a small fraction of the observed ﬂuctuations along the
Beveridge curve. Countercyclical movements in workers’ bargaining power appear to
be a more promising source of ﬂuctuations, but are diﬃcult to interpret in an axiomatic
bargaining model.
Section 4 shows that the comparative static results carry over to a stochastic model
with aggregate uncertainty and discounting. I allow for two types of shocks: labor
productivity shocks raise output in all matches but do not aﬀect the rate at which
employed workers lose their job; and job destruction shocks raise the rate at which
employed workers become unemployed but do not aﬀect the productivity in surviving
matches. This section also maintains the assumption of Nash bargaining over wages
in new matches, but continues to allow for the possibility that a worker and ﬁrm
2implicitly or explicitly agree to a long-term contract within the match. I specialize the
model in some dimensions, imposing a constant returns to scale matching function and
assuming that productivity is the same in all matches at any point in time. In other
words, Section 4 studies a stochastic version of the Pissarides (1985) model.2
I ﬁrst derive a forward-looking equation for the vacancy-unemployment ratio in
terms of model parameters. I then calibrate the model to match the data along as
many dimensions as possible. The calibration conﬁrms the quantitative predictions of
the comparative statics in the deterministic model. If the economy is hit only by pro-
ductivity shocks, it moves along a downward sloping Beveridge curve, but matching the
amplitude of the observed ﬂuctuations requires introducing labor productivity shocks
that are at least an order of magnitude larger than those in the data. Moreover, labor
productivity is perfectly correlated with the vacancy-unemployment ratio, indicating
that the model has almost no internal propagation mechanism. If the economy is hit
only by job destruction shocks, the vacancy-unemployment ratio is stable in the face
of large unemployment ﬂuctuations, so vacancies are countercyclical. Equivalently, the
model-generated Beveridge curve is upward-sloping.
Section 5 argues that the model’s basic shortcoming is the Nash bargaining as-
sumption, which implies that the wage in new jobs varies substantially in response
to aggregate labor market conditions. I show this by considering a related central-
ized economy. The decentralized and centralized economies behave identically if the
matching function is Cobb-Douglas in unemployment and vacancies, a generalization
of Hosios (1990). But if unemployment and vacancies are more substitutable, ﬂuctua-
tions are ampliﬁed in the centralized economy, essentially because the shadow wage is
less procyclical.
Section 6 reconciles this paper with a number of existing studies that claim standard
search and matching models are consistent with the business cycle behavior of labor
markets. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 7 by suggesting some modiﬁcations
to the model that might deliver rigid wages and thereby do a better job of matching
the empirical evidence on vacancies and unemployment.
2To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that quantitatively explores a stochastic search and matching
model with many aggregate states; for example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) assumes that there are
only three states.
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This section discusses the time series behavior of unemployment, vacancies, and labor
productivity in the United States. Table 1 summarizes the detrended data.
2.1 Unemployment
The unemployment rate is the most commonly used cyclical indicator of job search
activity. In an average month from 1951 to 2001, 5.7 percent of the U.S. labor force
was out of work, available for work, and actively seeking work. This time series exhibits
considerable temporal variation, falling as low as 2.6 percent in 1953 and 3.4 percent
in 1968 and 1969, but reaching 10.8 percent in 1982 and 1983 (Figure 1). Some of
these ﬂuctuations are almost certainly due to demographic and other factors unrelated
to business cycles. To highlight business-cycle-frequency ﬂuctuations, I take the ratio
of the unemployment rate to an extremely low frequency trend, a Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105 using quarterly data. The ratio of the
unemployment rate to its trend has a standard deviation of 0.19, so the unemployment
rate is often as much as 38 percent above or below trend. Detrended unemployment
also exhibits considerable persistence, with quarterly autocorrelation 0.92.
There is some question as to whether the unemployment rate or the employment-
population ratio is a better indicator of job search activity. Advocates of the latter
view, for example Cole and Rogerson (1999), argue that the number of workers moving
directly into employment from out-of-the-labor force is as large as the number who
move from unemployment to employment (Blanchard and Diamond 1990). On the
other hand, there is ample evidence that unemployment and nonparticipation are dis-
tinct economic conditions. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) show that almost all of
the cyclical volatility in prime-aged male nonemployment is accounted for by unem-
ployment. Flinn and Heckman (1983) show that unemployed workers are signiﬁcantly
more likely to ﬁnd a job than nonparticipants, although Jones and Riddell (1999) argue
that other variables also help to predict the likelihood of ﬁnding a job. In any case,
since labor market participation is procyclical, the employment-population ratio is a
more cyclical measure of job search activity, worsening the problems highlighted in this
paper.
It is also conceivable that when the unemployment rate rises, the amount of job
search activity per unemployed worker declines so much that aggregate search activity
actually falls. There is both direct and indirect evidence against this hypothesis. As
direct evidence, one would expect that a reduction in search intensity could be observed
4as a decline in the number of job search methods used or a switch towards towards less
time-intensive methods. An examination of Current Population Survey data indicates
no cyclical variation in the number or type of job search methods utilized. Indirect
evidence comes from estimates of matching functions, which universally ﬁnd that an
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the number of
matches (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). If job search activity declined sharply with
the unemployment rate, the matching function would be measured as decreasing in
the unemployment rate. I conclude that aggregate job search activity is positively
correlated with the unemployment rate.
2.2 Vacancies
The ﬂip side of unemployment is job vacancies. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) provides an ideal empirical deﬁnition: “A job opening requires that
1) a speciﬁc position exists, 2) work could start within 30 days, and 3) the employer
is actively recruiting from outside of the establishment to ﬁll the position. Included
are full-time, part-time, permanent, temporary, and short-term openings. Active re-
cruiting means that the establishment is engaged in current eﬀorts to ﬁll the opening,
such as advertising in newspapers or on the Internet, posting help-wanted signs, ac-
cepting applications, or using similar methods.”3 Unfortunately, JOLTS only began in
December 2000 and comparable data had never previously been collected in the U.S..
Although there are too few observations to look systematically at this time series, its
behavior during recession that began in March 2001 is instructive. During the ﬁrst
year of the survey, ﬁrms had 3.94 million job openings during an average month. This
declined by 19 percent, to 3.19 million, in the second year,4 with the decline most
noticeable (27 percent) when comparing the relatively strong six month period from
December 2000 to May 2001 with the relatively weak period from December 2001 to
May 2002. This suggests job vacancies are procyclical.
To obtain a longer time series, I use a standard proxy for vacancies, the Confer-
ence Board help-wanted advertising index, measured as the number of help-wanted
advertisements in 51 major newspapers.5 A potential shortcoming is that help-wanted
3This deﬁnition comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics news release, July 30, 2002, available at
http://www.bls.gov/jlt/jlt nr1.pdf.
4The decline in the help-wanted advertising index during the comparable period was somewhat larger,
27 percent.
5Abraham (1987) discusses this measure in detail. From 1972 to 1981, Minnesota collected state-wide job
vacancy data. Abraham (1987) compares this with Minnesota’s help-wanted advertising index and shows
that the two series track each other very closely through two business cycles and ten seasonal cycles.
5advertising is subject to low frequency ﬂuctuations that are only tangentially related
to the labor market: the Internet may have reduced ﬁrms’ reliance on newspapers as
a source of job advertising; newspaper consolidation may have increased advertising in
surviving newspapers; and Equal Employment Opportunity laws may have encouraged
ﬁrms to advertise job openings more extensively. Fortunately, a low frequency trend
should remove the eﬀect of these and other secular shifts. Figure 2 shows the help
wanted advertising index and its trend.
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between the cyclical component of
unemployment and vacancies, the ‘Beveridge curve’. The correlation of the percentage
deviation of unemployment and vacancies from trend is −0.90 between 1951 and 2001.6
Moreover, the magnitude of the cyclical variation in unemployment and vacancies is
almost identical, between 0.18 and 0.19, so the product of unemployment and vacancies
is nearly acyclical. In other words, when the cyclical component of the unemployment
rate falls from 6 to 5 percentage points, the cyclical component of vacancies rises
by approximately 17 percent as well. The vacancy-unemployment ratio is therefore
extremely procyclical, with a standard deviation of 0.35 around its trend.
An implication of the procyclicality of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is that it
should be harder to ﬁnd a job during a recession. Assume that the number of newly
hired workers is given by an increasing and constant returns to scale matching func-
tion m(u,v), depending on the unemployment rate u and the number of vacancies v.
Then the probability that any individual unemployed worker ﬁnds a job, the aver-
age transition rate from unemployment to employment, is λ(θ) ≡
m(u,v)
u = m(1,θ),
where θ ≡ v/u is the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Procyclicality of vacancies is then
equivalent to procyclicality of the job ﬁnding rate λ(θ).
Gross worker ﬂow data can be used to measure the job ﬁnding rate directly, and
indeed both the unemployment to employment and nonparticipation to employment
transition rates are strongly procyclical (Blanchard and Diamond 1990, Bleakley, Ferris,
and Fuhrer 1999, Abraham and Shimer 2001). Alternatively, the job ﬁnding rate
can be inferred from the dynamic behavior of the unemployment rate and average
unemployment duration. Let dt denote mean unemployment duration measured in
months. Then assuming all unemployed workers ﬁnd a job with probability λ(θt)i n
6Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989) discuss the U.S. Beveridge curve. Abra-
ham and Katz (1986) argue that the negative correlationbetween unemployment and vacancies is inconsistent
with Lilien’s (1982) sectoral shifts hypothesis, and instead indicates that business cycles are driven by ag-
gregate ﬂuctuations. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) conclude that at business cycle frequencies, shocks
generally drive the unemployment and vacancy rates in the opposite direction.
6month t,
dt+1 =
(1 + dt)ut(1 − λ(θt)) +

ut+1 − ut(1 − λ(θt))

ut+1
.
The numerator is the number of unemployed workers in period t who fail to ﬁnd a
job times the mean unemployment duration of those workers, 1 + dt,p l u st h en u m b e r
of newly unemployed workers in period t + 1, each of whom has an unemployment
duration of 1 month. This is divided through by the number of unemployed workers
in month t + 1 to get mean unemployment duration in that month. Equivalently,
λ(θt)=1−
(dt+1 − 1)ut+1
dtut
.
In steady state, ut = ut+1 and dt = dt+1, so the right hand side reduces to the inverse
of unemployment duration, a familiar relationship. Out of steady state, I infer the job
ﬁnding rate λ(θt) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) monthly measurements
of mean unemployment duration and the unemployment rate, based on the Current
Population Survey. The correlation between cyclical component of λ(θt)a n dut in
quarterly data is −0.89, and the coeﬃcient of variation on the job ﬁnding rate is 0.17,
only slightly smaller than the coeﬃcient of variation on the unemployment rate, 0.19.
The job ﬁnding rate is indeed strongly procyclical.
The procyclicality of the job ﬁnding rate might appear to contradict Blanchard
and Diamond’s (1990) conclusion that “the amplitude in ﬂuctuations in the ﬂow out of
employment is larger than that of the ﬂow into employment.” This is easily reconciled.
Blanchard and Diamond look at the number of people entering or exiting employment
in a given month, while I focus on the probability that an individual enters or exits
employment given her current employment state. Although the probability of entering
employment declines sharply in recessions, this is almost exactly oﬀset by the increase
in the unemployment rate, so that the number of people ﬁnding jobs is essentially
acyclic. Again, with an increasing matching function m(u,v), this is only possible if
procyclicality of vacancies oﬀsets countercyclicality of unemployment.
2.3 Labor Productivity
The third important empirical observation is the weak procyclicality of labor produc-
tivity, measured as real output per hour in the non-farm business sector. The BLS
constructs this quarterly time series as part of its Major Sector Productivity and Costs
program. The output measure is based on the National Income and Product Accounts,
while aggregate hours are constructed from the BLS establishment survey, the Current
7Employment Statistics. This series oﬀers two advantages compared with total factor
productivity: it is available quarterly since 1948; and it better corresponds to the
concept of labor productivity in the subsequent models, which do not include capital.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of labor productivity and Figure 5 compares the cycli-
cal components of the vacancy-unemployment ratio and labor productivity. There is
a positive correlation between the two time series and some evidence that labor pro-
ductivity leads the vacancy-unemployment ratio by about one year, with a maximum
correlation of 0.57. But the most important fact is that labor productivity is stable,
only once moving more than ﬁve percent away from trend. In contrast, the vacancy-
unemployment ratio has twice risen to double its trend level and ﬁve times fallen by
at least ﬁfty percent below trend, most recently at the end of 2001.
It is possible that the measured cyclicality of labor productivity is reduced by a
composition bias, since less productive workers are more likely to lose their jobs in
recessions. I oﬀer two responses to this concern. First, there is a composition bias that
points in the opposite direction: labor productivity is higher in more cyclical sectors
of the economy, e.g. durable goods manufacturing. And second, a large literature on
real wage cyclicality has reached a mixed conclusion about the importance of com-
position biases (Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995). Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994)
provide perhaps the strongest evidence that labor force composition is important for
wage cyclicality, but even they argue that accounting for this might double the mea-
sured variability of real wages. This paper argues that the search and matching model
cannot account for the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment unless labor
productivity is at least ten times as volatile as the data suggests, so composition bias
is at best an incomplete explanation.
3 Deterministic Model
I now examine whether search theory can reconcile the strong procyclicality of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio with the weak procyclicality of labor productivity. The
model I consider is a generalization of the textbook Mortensen-Pissarides matching
model (Pissarides 1985, Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000).
The economy consists of a measure 1 of risk-neutral, inﬁnitely-lived workers and
a continuum of risk-neutral, inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms. Time is continuous and I focus
throughout this section on steady states. I assume workers and ﬁrms discount future
payoﬀs at a common rate r>0, but focus on limiting results as r → 0. Workers can
either be unemployed or employed. An unemployed worker gets ﬂow utility z from
8non-market activity (‘leisure’) and searches for a job. An employed worker earns a
wage but may not search. I discuss wage determination shortly. Firms have a constant
returns to scale production technology that uses only labor. In order to hire a worker,
a ﬁrm must maintain an open vacancy at ﬂow cost c. Free entry drives the expected
present value of an open vacancy to zero.
Let u denote the unemployment rate and v denote the measure of vacancies in the
economy. The ﬂow of meetings is given by a function m(u,v),7 increasing in both argu-
ments. The meeting function may exhibit decreasing, constant, or increasing returns
to scale. An arbitrary unemployed worker ﬁnds a job according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate m(u,v)/u and an arbitrary vacancy contacts a worker according to a
Poisson process with arrival rate m(u,v)/v.
When a worker and ﬁrm ﬁrst meet, they realize an idiosyncratic match productivity
level p ∼ F(p) with support on a subset of [0, ˆ p]. Thereafter, productivity is hit by
a shock with Poisson arrival rate δ(p) > 0, with new productivity p  ∼ G(p |p). I
assume that for all p ∈ [0, ˆ p], G(0|p)=0a n dG(ˆ p|p) = 1, so productivity always
remains within these bounds. These productivity shocks may represent an underlying
stochastic process for productivity. For example, Pissarides (1985) assumes that the
initial productivity of a match is always equal to ˆ p, while subsequent shocks leave
the match with productivity 0. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) assume new matches
have productivity ˆ p, while following a shock, the new productivity level is drawn from
a distribution G(p ), independent of current productivity p. Alternatively, the shocks
may represent a learning process about match quality (Pries 2001). For example, the
initial expected productivity of a match may be at an intermediate level p ∈ (0, ˆ p).
After the ﬁrst shock hits, the worker and ﬁrm realize the actual productivity, either ˆ p
or 0 with probability π and 1 − π, respectively, where p = πˆ p. If productivity is equal
to 0, the match is immediately destroyed. If it is equal to ˆ p, the match continues until
another (low probability) shock destroys it. This process can easily be generalized to
allow for more gradual learning (Jovanovic 1979, Moscarini 2002).
There are generally bilateral gains from matching. I assume that when a worker
and ﬁrm ﬁrst meet, the expected gains from trade are divided according to the Nash
bargaining solution. The worker can threaten to become unemployed and the ﬁrm can
threaten to end the job. The present value of surplus beyond these threats is divided
between the worker and ﬁrm, with the worker keeping a fraction β ∈ (0,1) of the
surplus, her “bargaining power”. I make no assumption about what happens to wages
7Not all meetings result in matches in this model, and so I distinguish between the ‘meeting’ and ‘match-
ing’ functions. In the stochastic model in Section 4, all meetings result in matches, and so I use the terms
interchangeably.
9after this initial agreement. For example, the wage may be ﬁxed forever at its initial
value or it may be rebargained whenever the match is hit with a shock. Matches break
up whenever the surplus falls to zero.
3.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
I provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium of this economy using Bellman
equations. Let U denote the expected present value of an unemployed worker and S(p)
denote the expected present value of surplus in a match with productivity p.T h e n
rU = z +
m(u,v)
u
 ˆ p
0
max

βS(p),0

dF(p). (1)
The ﬂow value of an unemployed worker comes from her leisure z plus the probability
that she meets a ﬁrm times the expected capital gain, which is obtained by integrating
her share β of the match surplus S(p) over the density of productivity in new positive
surplus matches. If match surplus is negative, S(p) < 0, the meeting does not result
in a match. Similarly, free entry implies
c =
m(u,v)
v
 ˆ p
0
max

(1 − β)S(p),0

dF(p). (2)
For the sake of completeness, I also express the match surplus S(p) recursively as
rS(p)=p − rU + δ(p)
 ˆ p
0
max

−S(p),S(p ) − S(p)

dG(p |p);
however, this equation is not used in the analysis below. The current surplus is equal
to the amount produced p in excess of the worker’s ﬂow value if unemployed rU.T h e
match is shocked at rate δ(p), in which case the new productivity level p  is drawn
from the conditional distribution G(p |p). The match then ends if S(p ) < 0, resulting
in a capital gain −S(p), or it continues if S(p ) > 0, in which case the capital gain is
S(p ) − S(p).
3.2 Productivity, Vacancies, and Unemployment
There is no analytic solution to the model at this level of generality. This section
instead develops a key relationship between average labor productivity and the vacancy-
unemployment ratio in a limiting case, r → 0. Since in practice discounting accounts
both for the rate of time preference and for the impermanence of any match, and
10since empirically the average match dissolution rate is signiﬁcantly higher than the
discount rate, numerical simulations of the model show that setting r equal to zero is
quantitatively unimportant.
Eliminate m(u,v)
 ˆ p
0 max S(p),0 dF(p) from (1) using (2):
rU = z +
βcv
(1 − β)u
≡ ¯ y (3)
Equation (3) has been noted before in special cases of this model, e.g. equation (1.19)
in Pissarides (2000), but its quantitative implications appear to have been ignored.
Consider hypothetically an unemployed worker who is oﬀered a payoﬀ y forever, in
return for staying out of this economy. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, the present
value of her income is y/r, and so the oﬀer is accepted if y/r > U,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,b y
equation (3), if y>¯ y; it is rejected if y<¯ y; and the worker is indiﬀerent if y =¯ y.
Note that this choice is unaﬀected by the discount rate, since ¯ y is independent of r,
and still holds in the special case without discounting, r = 0. But in this special case,
the worker only cares about her average ﬂow income.8 This implies that if r =0 ,a
worker’s average ﬂow income is ¯ y. Since in an economy without discounting, free entry
drives a ﬁrm’s average ﬂow income to zero,9 ¯ y also represents aggregate ﬂow income.
Another expression for aggregate ﬂow income is
¯ y = uz +( 1− u)¯ p − vc, (4)
where ¯ p is average labor productivity. There are u unemployed workers, each of whom
earns leisure z,1− u employed workers with average productivity ¯ p,a n dv vacancies,
each imposing a ﬂow cost c. Eliminating ¯ y between equations (3) and (4) gives:
¯ p − z
c
=
((1 − β)u + β)v
(1 − β)(1 − u)u
. (5)
To my knowledge, this reduction of a broad class of equilibrium search models to a
single equation is novel.
Although it is not ap r i o r iobvious that comparative statics shed light on the
dynamic behavior of a model, I put aside this concern temporarily and interpret equa-
tion (5) as if it says something about business cycles; numerical simulations of the
8Stronger criterion, e.g. the overtaking criterion, may be useful in this case, but all imply that if one
income stream has a higher average ﬂow payoﬀ than another, the worker will prefer the former to the latter.
9Firms lose money when creating vacancies and earn proﬁts later. If ﬁrms discount future proﬁts, their
average ﬂow income must therefore be positive. But if r = 0, the gains and losses cancel out not only
intertermporally but also in the cross-section when the economy is in steady state.
11stochastic model in Section 4 will validate this presumption. I compute the right hand
side of equation (5) quarter-by-quarter using historical U.S. data on unemployment and
vacancies. The solid lines in Figure 6 plot the results for four diﬀerent constant values
of β. In each case, the right hand side is strongly procyclical and highly volatile. In fact,
for values of β in excess of 0.1, it is roughly proportional to the vacancy-unemployment
ratio, indicated by the dashed line in each ﬁgure,
v
u
≈ κ
¯ p − z
c
, (6)
where κ is a constant of proportionality. This implies that it takes large ﬂuctuations in
the diﬀerence between average labor productivity and the value of leisure, ¯ p − z,o ri n
the cost of a vacancy, c, in order to generate the observed movements in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio. For example, if average labor productivity is typically double the
value of leisure, an enormous ﬁve percent increase in average labor productivity raises
¯ p − z by ten percent and hence the vacancy-unemployment ratio moves by a similar
amount. But since the coeﬃcient of variation on the vacancy-unemployment ratio is 35
percent in U.S. data, the consequences of this shock for unemployment and vacancies
would be scarcely discernible.
This problem goes away if average labor productivity is only a few percent larger
than the value of leisure, but such a solution relies on an unappealing assumption that
market and non-market activities are almost equally productive. Another possibility
is that the value of leisure or the cost of a vacancy is volatile and countercyclical.
Absent the possibility of directly measuring these quantities, this too seems an unsat-
isfactory resolution. I conclude from the comparative statics that ﬂuctuations in labor
productivity, the value of leisure, or the vacancy cost are not promising impulses for
generating substantial variation in the vacancy-unemployment ratio in this model.
Alternatively, if labor productivity, the value of leisure, and the cost of a vacancy are
constant, changes in workers’ bargaining power β may induce ﬂuctuations in vacancies
and unemployment. Solving equation (5) for β gives
β =1−
v
(1 − u)

v + u
¯ p−z
c
.
I again use actual data on unemployment and vacancies. This time, I assume that
¯ p−z
c = 1282, a constant level so that workers’ bargaining power is, on average from
1951 to 2001, equal to 0.5. Figure 7 shows the requisite bargaining power shocks,
which are strongly negatively correlated with the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Su-
perﬁcially, this might seem to be an unlikely source of business cycle ﬂuctuations; if
12bargaining power is actually correlated with the business cycle, most people would
guess that it is procyclical. Still, a serious evaluation of the possibility that bargaining
power ﬂuctuations are relevant at business cycle frequencies requires a deeper expla-
nation of wage determination within the employment relationship. Section 5 argues
that a reasonable modiﬁcation to the search and matching model eﬀectively induces
countercyclical bargaining power in a reduced-form model.
To understand the separate behavior of unemployment and vacancies, and hence
movements along the Beveridge curve, it is necessary to impose more structure on the
model. Let ¯ δ denote the average rate at which employed workers lose their job, ρ
denote the fraction of meetings that result in matches, and assume that the meeting
function exhibits constant returns to scale,10 m(u,v)
u = m(1, v
u) ≡ λ(v
u), with λ(0) = 0
and λ concave. Then in steady state,
ρλ(v
u)u = ¯ δ(1 − u). (7)
Taking the approximation (6) as an exact relationship, we can solve for the unemploy-
ment and vacancy rates:
u =
¯ δ
¯ δ + ρλ(x)
and v =
¯ δx
¯ δ + ρλ(x)
, (8)
where x ≡ κ
¯ p−z
c . It is easy to conﬁrm that the unemployment rate is decreasing
in x and the vacancy rate is increasing in x for ﬁxed values of ¯ δ and ρ and for a
ﬁxed meeting function λ. This implies that an increase in labor productivity induces
the observed downward sloping Beveridge curve. Indeed, if λ(v
u)=µ
v
u, the steady
state equation (7) tells us that uv =
¯ δ(1 − u)/ρµ
2, and hence is nearly constant
in the face of variations in the composite parameter x, consistent with the empirical
evidence. On the other hand, an increase in the average job destruction rate ¯ δ or
decrease in the matching probability ρ raises both the unemployment and vacancy
rates if x is unchanged. Since the U.S. has never experienced a business cycle with an
upward sloping Beveridge curve, the model suggests it is unlikely that such shocks are
important at these frequencies.
It is worth pausing to ask which features of the search and matching model are
behind the results summarized in equation (5). The most signiﬁcant assumption is
that the match surplus in new jobs is divided proportionally between the worker and
ﬁrm via Nash bargaining. Consider the eﬀect of a productivity increase. Because the
10Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) argue that the existing body of empirical evidence suggests matching
functions exhibit constant returns to scale.
13supply of jobs is perfectly elastic, ﬁrms respond to an increase in proﬁts by creating
more vacancies. This raises unemployed workers’ meeting rate and hence the value
of unemployment, which is workers’ threat point when bargaining. Firms anticipate
having to pay higher wages and are reluctant to create many new jobs. In the end,
most of the productivity increase accrues to workers in the form of higher wages, leaving
little left over to shift the economy along the Beveridge curve. That is, wage ﬂexibility
in new jobs is the critical reason why the model does not generate large movements in
the vacancy-unemployment ratio in response to a productivity shock.
4 Stochastic Model
This section generalizes the model to allow for aggregate shocks and discounting but
specializes it by removing most of the microeconomic heterogeneity. I assume that at
any point in time, all jobs have a common productivity p>zand end exogenously at
rate δ, the job destruction rate.11 I further simplify the analysis by imposing constant
returns to scale on the meeting function m(u,v). Workers meet ﬁrms and accept jobs
at rate
m(u,v)
u ≡ λ(v
u) and ﬁrms meet and hire workers at rate
m(u,v)
v ≡ q(v
u), both
functions of the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ ≡ v
u. Note that all meetings result
in matches and so I sometimes refer to m as a ‘matching’, rather than a ‘meeting’,
function.
I introduce aggregate shocks by allowing average labor productivity and the job
destruction rate to follow a ﬁrst order Markov processes.12 A shock hits the economy
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate s, at which point a new pair (p ,δ )i s
drawn from a state dependent distribution. Let Ep,δXp ,δ  denote the expected value of
an arbitrary variable X following the next aggregate shock, conditional on the current
state (p,δ). I assume that this conditional expectation is ﬁnite, which is ensured if
the state space is compact. Moreover, I impose that p ≥ z in every history, which
guarantees that meetings always result in matches. At every point in time, the current
values of productivity and the job destruction rate are common knowledge. The model
is otherwise unchanged.
From the comparative statics exercise, I expect that an increase in average labor
productivity p will raise the vacancy rate and reduce the unemployment rate, but
11In terms of the deterministic model, the distribution of new jobs F puts all its weight on a single
productivity level p, while the distribution of old jobs G(p |p) puts all its weight on 0 <z ,s oo l dj o b sa r e
‘endogenously’ destroyed following the ﬁrst shock.
12Recall that average labor productivity may change due to a supply shock in a one-sector model or a
demand shock in a multi-sector model (Hall 2003).
14quantitatively by only a small amount. An increase in the job destruction rate δ will
scarcely aﬀect the vacancy-unemployment ratio because average labor productivity is
unchanged. Instead, both unemployment and vacancies will increase.
4.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
I look for an equilibrium in which the vacancy-unemployment ratio depends only on
the current value of p and δ, θp,δ.13 I characterize the equilibrium using a recursive
equation for match surplus, the joint value to a worker and ﬁrm of being matched in
excess of breaking up, as a function of the current aggregate state, Sp,δ.
rSp,δ = p −

z + λ(θp,δ)βSp,δ

− δSp,δ + s

Ep,δSp ,δ  − Sp,δ

. (9)
Appendix A derives this equation from more primitive conditions. The ﬁrst two terms
represent the current ﬂow surplus. If the pair is matched, they produce p units of
output. If they were to break up the match, free entry implies the ﬁrm would be
left with nothing, while the worker would become unemployed, getting leisure z and
a probability λ(θp,δ) of contacting a vacancy, in which event the worker would keep a
fraction β of the match surplus Sp,δ. Next, there is a ﬂow probability δ that the match
ends exogenously, destroying the surplus. Finally, an aggregate shock arrives at rate
s, resulting in an expected capital gain Ep,δSp ,δ  − Sp,δ.
Another critical equation for the match surplus comes from ﬁrms’ free entry con-
dition. The ﬂow cost of a vacancy c equals the ﬂow probability that the vacancy
contacts a worker times the resulting capital gain, which by Nash bargaining is equal
t oaf r a c t i o n1− β of the match surplus Sp,δ:
c = q(θp,δ)(1 − β)Sp,δ. (10)
Eliminating current and future values of Sp,δ from (9) using (10) gives
r + δ + s
q(θp,δ)
+ βθp,δ =( 1− β)
p − z
c
+ sEp,δ
1
q(θp ,δ )
, (11)
which implicitly deﬁnes the vacancy-unemployment ratio as a function of the current
state. This equation can easily be solved numerically, even with a large state vector.
This simple representation of the equilibrium of a stochastic version of the Pissarides
13It is straightforward to show in a deterministic version of this model that there is no other equilibrium,
e.g. one in which θ depends on the unemployment rate. See Pissarides (1985).
15(1985) model appears to be new to the literature.
An equation for the evolution of the unemployment rate closes the model:
˙ u(t)=δ(t)(1 − u(t)) − λ(θp(t),δ(t))u(t), (12)
where (p(t),δ(t)) is the aggregate state at time t. An initial condition pins down the
unemployment rate and the aggregate state at some date t0.
In some special cases, equation (11) can be solved analytically. First, suppose that
each vacancy contacts an unemployed worker at a constant Poisson rate µ, independent
of the unemployment rate, so q(θ)=µ. Given the risk-neutrality assumptions, this is
equivalent to assuming that ﬁrms must pay a ﬁxed cost c
µ in order to hire a worker.
Then equation (11) yields a static equation for the vacancy-unemployment ratio:
θp,δ =
(1 − β)(p − z)
βc
−
r + δ
βµ
.
Moreover, if the interest rate is equal to zero, r = 0, this equation reduces to
p − z
c
=
(β +( 1− β)u∗
p,δ)θp,δ
(1 − β)(1 − u∗
p,δ)
,
where u∗
p,δ ≡ δ
δ+µθp,δ is the state-contingent steady state unemployment rate from equa-
tion (12). With this matching function, the comparative statics in the deterministic
model (equation 5) are virtually identical to the nonstationary behavior of the stochas-
tic model. I do not use this restriction on the matching function in the numerical work
below, however, because it implies too little volatility in vacancies.
At the opposite extreme, suppose that each unemployed worker contacts a va-
cancy at a constant Poisson rate µ, independent of the vacancy rate, so λ(θ)=µ and
q(θ)=µ/θ. Also assume that the job destruction rate δ is constant and average labor
productivity p is a Martingale, Epp  = p. With this matching function, equation (11)
is linear in current and future values of the vacancy-unemployment ratio:

r + δ + s
µ
+ β
	
θp =( 1− β)
p − z
c
+
s
µ
Epθp .
It is straightforward to verify that the vacancy-unemployment ratio is linear in pro-
ductivity, and therefore Epθp  = θp. In the limiting case of r = 0, this equation can be
expressed as
p − z
c
=
(β +( 1− β)u∗)θp
(1 − β)(1 − u∗)
,
16where u∗ ≡ δ
δ+µ is the steady state unemployment rate from equation (12). The re-
lationship between average labor productivity and the vacancy-unemployment ratio
once again coincides with the ﬁndings from the comparative statics of the determinis-
tic model. But a shortcoming of this parameterization is that productivity shocks do
not aﬀect the job ﬁnding rate µ or job losing rate δ, and hence do not aﬀect the unem-
ployment rate. My numerical work uses an intermediate assumption on the elasticity
of the matching function.
4.2 Parameterization
In this section, I parameterize the model to match the time series behavior of the U.S.
unemployment rate. The most important question is the choice of the Markov process
for productivity and job destruction. Appendix B develops a discrete state space model
which builds on a simple Poisson process corresponding to the theoretical analysis in
Section 4.1. I deﬁne an underlying variable y that lies on a ﬁnite ordered set of points.
When a Poisson shock hits, y either moves up or down by one point. The probability
of moving up is decreasing in the current value of y, which ensures that y is mean
reverting. The stochastic variables are then expressed as functions of y.
Although I also use the discrete state space model in my simulations as well, it
is almost exactly correct and signiﬁcantly easier to think about the behavior of the
extrinsic shocks by discussing a related continuous state space model. I express the
state variables as functions of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (See Taylor and Karlin
1998, Section 8.5). Let y satisfy
dy = −γydt+ σdz,
where z is a standard Brownian motion. Here γ>0 is a measure of persistence, with
higher values indicating faster mean reversion, and σ>0 is the instantaneous standard
deviation. This process has some convenient properties: y is conditionally and uncon-
ditionally normal; it is mean reverting, with expected value converging asymptotically
to zero; and asymptotically its variance converges unconditionally to σ2
2γ.
I consider two diﬀerent cases. In the ﬁrst, job destruction is constant and produc-
tivity satisﬁes p =( 1− ey)z + eyp∗,w h e r ey is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with
parameters γ and σ,a n dp∗ >zis a measure of long-run average productivity. Since
ey > 0, this ensures p>z . In the second case, productivity is constant and job destruc-
tion satisﬁes δ = eyδ∗, where again y follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and now
δ∗ > 0 is a measure of long-run average job destruction. In both cases, the stochastic
17process is reduced to three parameters, γ, σ, and either p∗ or δ∗.
I now proceed to explain the choice of the other parameters, starting with the
case of stochastic productivity. I follow the literature and assume that the matching
function is Cobb-Douglas,
λ(θ)=θq(θ)=µθα.
This reduces the calibration to ten parameters: the productivity parameter p∗,t h e
value of leisure z, workers’ bargaining power β, the discount rate r, the job destruction
rate δ, the two matching function parameters α and µ, the vacancy cost c,a n dt h e
mean reversion and standard deviation of the stochastic process, γ and σ.
Without loss of generality, I normalize the productivity parameter to p∗ =1 .Is e t
the value of leisure to z =0 .4. Interpreted as an unemployment beneﬁt, this lies at
the upper end of the range of income replacement rates in the United States.14 The
deterministic model suggests that much higher values of z (i.e. z → p∗) will signiﬁcantly
increase the impact of a productivity shock. I set the bargaining parameter to β =1 /2,
a standard assumption in a literature that lacks any evidence to the contrary. This
has little eﬀect on the cyclical behavior of the model economy.
I normalize a time period to be one quarter, and therefore set the discount rate to
r =0 .012, equivalent to an annual discount factor of 0.953. I use two data sources to
pin down the job destruction rate δ. First, Abowd and Zellner (1985) ﬁnd that 3.42
percent of employed workers exit employment during a typical month between 1972
and 1982, after correcting for classiﬁcation and measurement error. Second, the Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey constructs an employer-based measure of labor
turnover. From December 2000 to November 2002, 3.36 percent of employed workers
left their current employer in a typical month. Although some of these undoubtedly
moved to another employer,15 it is reassuring how similar this number is to Abowd
and Zellner’s (1985) estimates. In the model with productivity shocks, I ﬁx the job
destruction rate at δ =0 .1p e rq u a r t e r .
I set the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies at α =1 /2,
intermediate to the two special cases discussed at the end of Section 4.1. This generates
roughly equal but opposite ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies in response to
productivity shocks. I use the next two parameters, the matching function constant µ
and the vacancy cost c, to pin down the average unemployment rate and the average
14Mean labor income in the model is 1.02.
15In an average month, more than half of the turnover, 1.88 percent of employed workers, quit their current
job, while only 1.23 percent were laid oﬀ or discharged. The remaining workers left for other reasons, e.g.
retirement or maternity leave. Other evidence suggests that many of the quits do not move directly to
another job.
18vacancy rate. The data indicate an unemployment rate just below six percent on
average. I do not have direct evidence on vacancy rates, but fortunately the model
oﬀers one more normalization. Equation (11) implies that doubling c and multiplying
µ by a factor 2α divides the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ in half, doubles the worker-
ﬁnding rate q(θ), and has no eﬀect on the wage or the job ﬁnding rate λ(θ). In other
words, the average vacancy rate is intrinsically meaningless. I choose to target a mean
vacancy-unemployment ratio of 1, which requires setting µ =1 .7a n dc =0 .54.
I choose the standard deviation and persistence of the productivity process to match
two ﬁnal facts, the standard deviation of unemployment and the correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, the Beveridge curve relationship. The link between the
standard deviation of productivity and the standard deviation of unemployment is
clear. The persistence of productivity aﬀects the correlation between unemployment
and vacancies because if productivity is less persistent, vacancies are more volatile,
reducing the correlation with unemployment. To match the data, I set σ =0 .161
and γ =0 .08.16 Finally, I work on a discrete grid with 2001 points, which closely
approximate Gaussian innovations.17 This implies that Poisson arrival rate of shocks
is s = nγ = 80 times per quarter. Again, Appendix B discusses the relationship
between the continuous and discrete state space models.
In the case of shocks to the job destruction rate, I change only the standard devi-
ation of the stochastic process, reducing it to σ =0 .076. Productivity is constant and
equal to 1, while the mean job destruction rate δ∗ =0 .1. Simulations show that this
leaves the mean, standard deviation, and ﬁrst autocorrelation of the unemployment
rate virtually unchanged. For reasons already discussed and emphasized further be-
low, it is impossible to match the correlation between unemployment and vacancies in
the economy with job destruction shocks. Table 2 summarizes the parameter choices
in the two simulations.
4.3 Results
This section examines the joint behavior of unemployment and vacancies in response
to productivity and job destruction shocks. The main conclusion is that the ana-
lytic comparative static results closely approximate the numerical dynamic stochastic
results.
16The quarterly autocorrelation of productivity is approximately 1−γ =0 .92, lower than in standard real
business cycle models (Cooley and Prescott 1995).
17The results are remarkably similar using a much courser grid, including only three points. Only third
and higher moments are substantially aﬀected by the discreteness of the state space. Details are available
upon request.
19I use equation (11) to ﬁnd the state-contingent vacancy-unemployment ratio θp,δ
and then simulate the model. That is, starting with an initial unemployment rate and
aggregate state at time 0, I use a pseudo-random number generator to calculate the
arrival time of the ﬁrst Poisson shock. I compute the unemployment rate when that
shock arrives, generate a new aggregate state using the discrete state space stochastic
mean reverting process described in Appendix B, and repeat. At the end of each period
(quarter), I record the aggregate state and the unemployment rate. After 100,000 pe-
riods, I calculate a set of summary statistics. Table 3 reports the average results from
100 such simulations, i.e. a total of 10 million ‘quarters’ of data encompassing approx-
imately 800 million Poisson shocks. The top panel depicts the eﬀect of productivity
shocks, while the bottom panel shows the eﬀect of job destruction shocks.
The comovement of unemployment and vacancies in responseto productivity shocks,
shown in the top panel of Table 3, is largely consistent with the empirical evidence sum-
marized in Table 1; however, recall that I chose parameters to match the mean and
coeﬃcient of variation for unemployment and the correlation between unemployment
and vacancies. The model predicts that vacancies are slightly more volatile than un-
employment, while the data suggests they have nearly the same volatility. This can
be mended by increasing the share of vacancies in the matching function, α.Am o r e
serious concern lies with the persistence of the two variables. The model predicts
unemployment is very persistent, with a quarterly ﬁrst order autocorrelation of 0.96,
while vacancies are much less persistent, with ﬁrst order autocorrelation 0.84. In the
data, both have an intermediate level of persistence, with vacancies slightly more per-
sistent than unemployment. It is likely that anything that makes vacancies a state
variable, such as planning lags or an adjustment cost in job creation, would increase
its persistence and reduce its volatility, bringing the model more in line with the data.
The real problem with the model lies in the magnitude of the underlying produc-
tivity shocks. According to the data, the coeﬃcient of variation of average labor pro-
ductivity is about 1.8 percent. The stochastic model requires productivity shocks that
are 14 times as large in order to generate the observed ﬂuctuations in unemployment.
The source of this lack of ampliﬁcation can be understood in terms of equation (5)
from the deterministic model. A one percent increase in average labor productivity
raises the gap between market and non-market activity, p − z,b ya b o u t 1%
¯ p−z =1 .54
percent, where ¯ p =1 .05 is the mean level of productivity. Equation (5) suggests the
response of the vacancy-unemployment ratio should be of a similar order of magnitude;
in fact, the coeﬃcient of variation on the vacancy-unemployment ratio is 1.65 times
as large as the coeﬃcient of variation on labor productivity. Not only is there little
20ampliﬁcation, but there is also no propagation of the labor productivity shock in the
model. The contemporaneous correlation between labor productivity and the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is 1.00. In the data, the contemporaneous correlation is 0.40 and
the vacancy-unemployment ratio lags labor productivity by about one year.
Turning this around, during the past 50 years, productivity has never increased
by more than 5 percent above trend. According to the model, such an extreme event
should increase the vacancy-unemployment ratio to perhaps 8 percent above trend.
It follows that if the model is correct, almost all of the ﬂuctuations in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio during the post-war period were not a consequence of productivity
shocks.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows that job destruction shocks induce an almost
perfectly positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies, an event that has
essentially never been observed at business cycle frequencies (see Figure 2). As a result,
job destruction shocks produce almost no variability in the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. This is a dynamic reﬂection of equation (8) in the deterministic model. Assume
there is no change in the constant x, which summarizes the behavior of average labor
productivity, the value of leisure, the cost of a vacancy, and workers’ bargaining power.
Then an increase in the job destruction rate raises both unemployment and vacancies.
To summarize, the stochastic model conﬁrms that job destruction shocks induce a
positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies. It also conﬁrms that, while
productivity shocks are qualitatively consistent with a downward sloping Beveridge
curve, the search model does not substantially amplify the extrinsic shocks and so
productivity shocks induce only very small movements along the curve. These results
are consistent with the intuition developed in the deterministic model.
4.4 Wages
Until this point, I have assumed that the surplus in new matches is divided according
to a generalized Nash bargaining solution, but have made no assumption about the
division of surplus in old matches. Although this is suﬃcient for determining the
response of unemployment and vacancies to exogenous shocks, it does not pin down
the timing of wage payments. In this section, I introduce an additional assumption,
that the surplus in all matches, new or old, is always divided according to the Nash
bargaining solution, and so wages are renegotiated following each aggregate shock.
This stronger restriction pins down the wage as a function of the aggregate state,
wp,δ. This facilitates a more detailed discussion of wages, which serves two purposes.
First, I have argued that ﬂexibility of the present value of wage payments is critical for
21the many of the results emphasized in this paper. Modelling wages further illuminates
that point. And second, it enables me to relate this paper to a literature that examines
whether search models can generate rigid wages. Appendix C proves that a continually
renegotiated wage solves
wp,δ =( 1− β)z + β(p + cθp,δ). (13)
This generalizes equation (1.20) in Pissarides (2000) to a stochastic environment.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a job destruction shock on the wage. An increase in
the job destruction rate δ induces a slight decline in the vacancy-unemployment ratio
(see Table 3), which in turn, by equation (13), reduces wages slightly. Although the
direct eﬀect of the shock lowers ﬁrms’ proﬁts by shortening the duration of matches,
the resulting decline in wages partially oﬀsets this. In net, the drop in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is small, and since the increase in job destruction raises the un-
employment rate by shortening unemployment duration, the vacancy rate increases as
well. In addition, equation (13) indicates that a job destruction shock will have little
eﬀect on the wage since it has little eﬀect on the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
Second, consider a productivity shock. For simplicity, assume that the value of
leisure is zero, so an increase in p causes approximately a proportional increase in the
vacancy-unemployment ratio. Equation (13) implies that the wage must also increase
by the same proportion. This soaks up most of the productivity shock, giving little
incentive for ﬁrms to create new vacancies. Hence there is a modest increase in va-
cancies and decrease in unemployment in response to a large productivity shock. The
response of wages is nearly proportional to the productivity shock, at least when the
value of leisure is small.
If wages are not continually renegotiated, this analysis is inapplicable. Nevertheless,
the frequency of wage negotiation does not aﬀect the expected present value of wage
payments in new matches (where wage negotiation is required). It only changes the
timing of wage payments. An increase in productivity or decrease in job destruction
raises the present value of wage payments in new jobs and therefore has little eﬀect on
the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
5 Optimal Vacancy-Unemployment Fluctuations
Another way to highlight the role played by the Nash bargaining assumption is to
examine a centralized economy in which it is possible to sidestep the wage-setting
22issue entirely.18 Consider a hypothetical social planner who chooses a state-contingent
vacancy-unemployment ratio in order to maximize the present discounted value of
output net of vacancy creation costs. In the stochastic model, the planner’s problem
is represented recursively as
rW(p,δ,u)=m a x
θ


zu+ p(1 − u) − cuθ + Wu(p,δ,u)

δ(1 − u) − uλ(θ)

+ sEp,δ

W(p ,δ ,u) − W(p,δ,u)

.
Instantaneous output is equal to z times the unemployment rate u plus p times the
employment rate minus c times the number of vacancies v ≡ uθ. The value changes
gradually as the unemployment rate adjusts, with ˙ u(t)=δ(1 − u(t)) − u(t)λ(θ), and
suddenly when an aggregate shock changes the state from (p,δ)t o( p ,δ )a tr a t es.
It is straightforward to verify that in the solution to this problem, the Bellman
value W is linear in the unemployment rate, Wu(p,δ,u)= −c
λ (θp,δ), and the vacancy-
unemployment ratio satisﬁes
r + δ + s
λ (θp,δ)
− θp,δ

1 −
λ(θp,δ)
θp,δλ (θp,δ)
	
=
p − z
c
+ sEp,δ

1
λ (θp ,δ )
	
.
This implicitly deﬁnes the optimal θp,δ, independent of the unemployment rate.
With a Cobb-Douglas matching function m(u,v)=µuαv1−α, this reduces to
r + δ + s
q(θp,δ)
+ αθp,δ =( 1− α)
p − z
c
+ sEp,δ

1
q(θp ,δ )
	
,
a special case of equation (11), with workers’ bargaining power β equal to the elastic-
ity α. This generalizes the Hosios (1990) condition for eﬃciency of the decentralized
equilibrium to an economy with stochastic productivity and job destruction rates.
Since the numerical example in Section 4.3 assumed a Cobb-Douglas matching func-
tion with α = β, the equilibrium allocation described in that section solves the social
planner’s problem. Conversely, if those parameter values describe the U.S. economy,
the observed degree of wage rigidity is inconsistent with output maximization.
With other matching functions, the link between the equilibrium with wage bar-
gaining and the solution to the planner’s problem is broken. At one extreme, if unem-
18A number of papers examine a ‘competitive’ search economy, in which ﬁrms can commit to wages before
hiring workers and can increase their hiring rate by promising higher wages (Peters 1991, Montgomery 1991,
Moen 1997, Shimer 1996, Burdett, Shi, and Wright 2001). It is by now well-known that a competitive
search equilibrium maximizes output, essentially by creating a market for job applications. This discussion
of output maximizing search behavior therefore also pertains to these models.
23ployment and vacancies are perfect substitutes, i.e. λ(θ)=αu + αvθ, then the output-
maximizing vacancy-unemployment ratio is inﬁnite whenever αv(p−z) >c (r+δ+αu)
and is zero if the inequality is reversed. With near-perfect substitutability, the output-
maximizing vacancy-unemployment ratio is very sensitive to current productivity. This
implies small productivity shocks generate large movements in the unemployment
rate. On the other hand, if unemployment and vacancies are perfect complements,
λ(θ)=m i n  αu,α vθ , the vacancy-unemployment ratio never strays from the eﬃcient
ratio αu
αv. With imperfect complements, the impact of productivity shocks on the
vacancy-unemployment ratio is muﬄed but not eliminated.
The economics behind these theoretical ﬁndings is quite simple. An increase in labor
productivity relative to the value of non-market activity and the cost of advertising a
vacancy induces a switch away from the expensive activity, unemployment, and towards
the relatively cheap activity, vacancies. The magnitude of the switch depends on how
substitutable unemployment and vacancies are in the job search process. If they are
strong complements, substitution is nearly impossible and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio barely changes. If they are strong substitutes, substitution is nearly costless, and
the vacancy-unemployment ratio is highly procyclical.
In the decentralized economy, the extent of substitution between unemployment
and vacancies is not governed by technology (the matching function) but rather by
the bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution eﬀectively corresponds to a
moderate degree of substitutability, the Cobb-Douglas case. If wages were more rigid,
an increase in productivity would induce more vacancy creation and less unemployment,
analogous to a centralized environment with a high elasticity of substitution in the
matching function.
The substitutability of unemployment and vacancies is an empirical issue. Blan-
chard and Diamond (1989) use nonlinear least squares to estimate a Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) matching function on U.S. data. Their point estimate for the
elasticity of substitution is 0.74, i.e. slightly less substitutable than the Cobb-Douglas
case, although they cannot reject the Cobb-Douglas elasticity of 1. To my knowledge,
no one else has examined this elasticity of substitution. Given the poor quality of the
data Blanchard and Diamond (1989) use, one might be concerned that this result could
be overturned. But taking it as a fact, optimal movements along the Beveridge curve
should be slightly less pronounced than the those predicted by the model with Nash
bargaining and much less pronounced than those in the data.
246 Related Literature
There is a large literature that explores whether the search model is consistent with the
cyclical behavior of labor markets. Some papers look at the implications of the model
for the behavior of various stocks and ﬂows, including the unemployment and vacancy
rates, but do not examine the implicit magnitude of the exogenous impulses. Others
assume that business cycles are driven by ﬂuctuations in the job destruction rate δ.
These papers either impose exogenously or derive within the model a counterfactually
constant vacancy-unemployment ratio θ. A third group of papers has tried but failed
to reconcile the procyclicality of the vacancy-unemployment ratio with extrinsic shocks
of a plausible magnitude.
Papers by Abraham and Katz (1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), and Cole
and Rogerson (1999) ﬁt into the ﬁrst category, matching the behavior of labor market
stocks and ﬂows by sidestepping the magnitude of impulses. For example, Abraham
and Katz (1986) argue that the downward sloping Beveridge curve is inconsistent with
models in which unemployment is driven by ﬂuctuations in the job destruction rate, no-
tably Lilien’s (1982) sectoral shifts model. That leads them to advocate an alternative
in which unemployment ﬂuctuations are driven by aggregate disturbances, e.g. produc-
tivity shocks. Unfortunately, they fail to examine the magnitude of shocks needed to
deliver the observed shifts along the Beveridge curve. Blanchard and Diamond (1989)
also focus on the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, but they
do not model the supply of jobs and hence do not explain why there are so few vacancies
during recessions. Instead, they assume the total stock of jobs follows an exogenous
stochastic process. This paper pushes the cyclicality of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio to the front of the picture. Likewise, Cole and Rogerson (1999) argue that the
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model can match a variety of business cycle facts, but
they do so in a reduced form model that treats ﬂuctuations in the job ﬁnding rate, and
hence implicitly in the vacancy-unemployment ratio, as exogenous.
The second group of papers, including work by Pries (2001), Ramey and Wat-
son (1997), Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), and Gomes, Greenwood, and Re-
belo (2001), assume that employment ﬂuctuations are largely due to time-variation
in the job destruction rate, minimizing the role played by the observed cyclicality of
the vacancy-unemployment ratio. These papers typically deliver rigid wages from a
search model, consistent with the ﬁndings in Section 4.4. Building on the ideas in
Hall (1995), Pries (2001) shows that a brief adverse shock that destroys some old em-
ployment relationships can generate a long transition period of high unemployment
as the displaced workers move through a number of short-term jobs before eventually
25ﬁnding their way back into long-term relationships. During this transition process, the
vacancy-unemployment ratio remains constant, since aggregate economic conditions
have returned to normal. Equivalently, the economy moves along an upward sloping
Beveridge curve during the transition period, in contradiction to the evidence. Ramey
and Watson (1997) argue that two-sided asymmetric information generates rigid wages
in a search model. But in their model, shocks to the job destruction rate are the only
source of ﬂuctuations in unemployment. The job ﬁnding rate λ(θ) is exogenous and
constant, which is equivalent to assuming that vacancies are proportional to unemploy-
ment. This is probably an important part of the explanation for why their model pro-
duces rigid wages. Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) show that ﬂuctuations in the
job destruction rate amplify productivity shocks in a model similar to the one examined
here; however, they do not discuss the cyclical behavior of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. It is unlikely that they are successful in matching the empirical volatility of this
key variable. Similarly, Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) sidestep the vacancy-
unemployment issue by looking at a model in which the job ﬁnding rate is exogenous
and constant, i.e. vacancies are proportional to unemployment. Again, this helps keep
wages relatively rigid in their model.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is probably the best known paper in this literature.
In their three state ‘illustrative simulation’, the authors introduce, without comment,
enormous productivity or leisure shocks into their model. Average labor productivity
minus the value of leisure p − z is approximately three times as high in the good state
as in the bad state.19 This paper conﬁrms that in response to such large shocks, the
vacancy-unemployment ratio should also be about three times as large in the good
state as in the bad state, but argues that there is no evidence for these large shocks in
the data. Even if one accepts the magnitude of the implied impulses, Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) still only delivers a correlation of −0.26 between unemployment and
vacancies, far lower than the empirical value of −0.90. This is probably because of the
tension between productivity shocks, which put the economy on a downward-sloping
Beveridge curve, and endogenous movements in the job destruction rate, which have the
opposite eﬀect. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) both put the standard search model
into a real business cycle framework with risk aversion, capital accumulation, and other
extensions. Neither paper can match the negative correlation between unemployment
and vacancies and both papers generate real wages that are too ﬂexible in response
to productivity shocks. Thus these papers encounter the problem I highlight in this
19This calculation would be easy in the absence of heterogeneity, i.e. if their parameter σ were equal to
zero. Then ¯ p − z would take on three possible values: 0.022, 0.075, and 0.128, for a six-fold diﬀerence in
¯ p − z between the high and low states.
26paper, although they do not emphasize this shortcoming of the search model. Finally,
in contemporaneous work, Hall (2002) highlights the same issues that I emphasize here.
Hall (2003) proposes one solution: sectoral demand shocks can generate large move-
ments in real sectoral productivity and hence in the sectoral vacancy-unemployment
ratio.
7C o n c l u s i o n
I have argued in this paper that a search and matching model in which wages are deter-
mined by Nash bargaining cannot generate substantial movements along a downward
sloping Beveridge curve in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude. A productivity
shock primarily results in higher wages, with little eﬀect on the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. A job destruction shock generates an increase in both unemployment and va-
cancies. It is important to stress that this is not an attack on the search approach to
labor markets, but rather a critique of the commonly-used Nash bargaining assumption
for wage determination. An alternative wage determination mechanism that generates
more rigid wages in new jobs (measured in present value terms) will amplify the eﬀect
of productivity shocks on the vacancy-unemployment ratio, helping to reconcile the
evidence and theory.
If the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, the observed behavior of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is not socially optimal, but it is optimal if the elasticity of sub-
stitution between unemployment and vacancies in the matching function is large. The
existing estimate of a CES matching function suggests that the Cobb-Douglas assump-
tion is approximately right, and so observed wages are ‘too rigid’.
One way to generate more rigid wages in a theoretical model is to drop some of
the informational assumptions in the standard search model.20 For example, suppose
workers know about aggregate variables, including the unemployment rate and the
aggregate productivity distribution F and G, but they do not know how productive
they are in a particular job. Also assume workers can make take-it-or-leave-it wage
demands, which ﬁrms accept if the worker asks for less than her productivity. On the
margin, a worker faces a tradeoﬀ between demanding a higher wage and reducing her
risk of unemployment. As a result, an optimal wage demand depends on the hazard
rate of the productivity distribution. Vacancy creation, on the other hand, depends
20Ramey and Watson (1997) develop a search model with two-sided asymmetric information. Because
they assume workers’ job ﬁnding rate is exogenous and acyclic, their results are not directly applicable to
this analysis, although their methodology may prove useful.
27on the expected value of productivity in excess of workers’ optimal wage demand. In
such a model, a shift in the productivity distribution may change ﬁrms’ incentive to
create jobs while having little eﬀect on wages, or vice versa. In other words, asymmetric
information can break the link between the vacancy-unemployment ratio and the wage.
A model in which ﬁrms cannot verify workers’ outside opportunities, e.g. their value of
leisure or alternative wage oﬀers, delivers similar predictions. At this point, it is unclear
whether either model delivers wage rigidity, in the sense that large wage changes are
infrequently observed, or if they simply weaken the correlation between wages and the
vacancy-unemployment ratio.
Another possibility is to modify the standard search model so as to make wages at
least partially backward-looking. For example, in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model of on-the-job search, ﬁrms have an incentive to oﬀer high wages in order to
attract workers away from competitors and to reduce labor turnover. Burdett and
Mortensen show that this results in steady state wage dispersion even if all workers
and jobs are identical. To my knowledge, no one has analyzed the out-of-steady state
behavior of this model.21 Intuitively, wage oﬀers are backward looking, because the
cost of luring a worker away from her current employer depends on the existing wage
distribution, and forward looking, because the likelihood that a worker quits depends
on the wage oﬀers she receives in the future. Both eﬀects help keep wages low in
expansions and high in recessions, although it will take further research to see whether
this mechanism is quantitatively signiﬁcant.
21But see Coles (2001) for work on a related model.
28Appendix
A Derivation of the Equation for Surplus (9)
For notational simplicity alone, assume the wage payment depends only on the aggre-
gate state, wp,δ, not on the history of the match. I return to this issue at the end
of this section. Deﬁne Up,δ, Ep,δ,a n dJp,δ to be the state-contingent present value of
an unemployed worker, employed worker, and ﬁlled job, respectively. They are linked
recursively by:
rUp,δ = z + λ(θp,δ)

Ep,δ − Up,δ

+ s

Ep,δUp ,δ  − Up,δ

(14)
rEp,δ = wp,δ − δ

Ep,δ − Up,δ

+ s

Ep,δEp ,δ  − Ep,δ

(15)
rJp,δ = p − wp,δ − δJp,δ + s

Ep,δJp ,δ  − Jp,δ

(16)
Equation (14) states that the ﬂow value of an unemployed worker is equal to her value
of leisure z plus the probability she ﬁnds a job λ(θp,δ) times the resulting capital gain
E−U plus the probability of an aggregate shock times that capital gain. Equation (15)
expresses a similar idea for an employed worker, who receives a wage payment wp,δ but
loses her job at rate δ. Equation (16) provides an analogous recursive formulation for
the value of a ﬁlled job. Note that a ﬁrm is left with nothing when a ﬁlled job ends.
Sum equations (15) and (16) and then subtract equation (14), deﬁning Sp,δ ≡
Jp,δ + Ep,δ − Up,δ:
rSp,δ = p − z − λ(θp,δ)

Ep,δ − Up,δ

− δSp,δ + s

Ep,δSp ,δ  − Sp,δ

. (17)
In addition, the Nash bargaining solution implies that the wage is set so as to maximize
the Nash product

Ep,δ − Up,δ
βJ
1−β
p,δ ,w h i c hg i v e s
Ep,δ − Up,δ
β
= Sp,δ =
Jp,δ
1 − β
. (18)
Substituting for E − U in equation (17) yields equation (9).
If I allow wages to depend in an arbitrary manner on the history of the match,
this would aﬀect the Bellman values E and J; however, the wage, and therefore the
history-dependence, would drop out when summing the Bellman equations for E and
J, assuming matches end only when the surplus is negative. In other words, the match
surplus S is unchanged and in particular is not history dependent, regardless of the
29frequency of wage renegotiation.
B The Stochastic Process
The text describes a continuous state space approximation to the discrete state space
model used in both the theory and simulations. Here I describe the discrete state space
model and show that it asymptotes to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Consider a random variable y that is hit with shocks according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate s. The initial value of y lies on a discrete grid,
y ∈ Y ≡{ − n∆,−(n − 1)∆,...,0,...,(n − 1)∆,n∆},
where ∆ > 0 is the step size and 2n +1≥ 3 is the number of grid points. When a
shock hits, the new value y  either moves up or down by one grid point:
y  =

y +∆
y − ∆
with probability

1
2

1 −
y
n∆

1
2

1+
y
n∆

Note that although the step size is constant, the probability that y  = y +∆ is smaller
when y is larger, falling from 1 at y = −n∆ to zero at y = n∆.
It is trivial to conﬁrm that y  ∈ Y , so the state space is discrete. To proceed further,
deﬁne γ ≡ s/n and σ ≡
√
s∆. For any ﬁxed y(t), I examine the behavior of y(t + h)
over an arbitrarily short time period h. For suﬃciently short h, the probability that
two Poisson shocks arrive is negligible, and so y(t+h)i se q u a lt oy(t) with probability
1−hs, has increased by ∆ with probability hs
2

1 −
y
n∆

, and has decreased by ∆ with
probability hs
2

1+
y
n∆

. Adding this together shows
E(y(t + h) − y(t)|y(t)) = −
hs
n
y(t)=−hγy(t).
Next, the conditional variance of y(t + h) − y(t) can be decomposed into
Var (y(t + h) − y(t)|y(t)) = E

(y(t + h) − y(t))2|y(t)

−

E

y(t + h) − y(t)|y(t)
2.
The ﬁrst term evaluates to hs∆2 over a suﬃciently short time interval h, since it is
equal to ∆2 if a shock, positive or negative, arrives and zero otherwise. The second
term is (hγy(t))2, and so is negligible over a short time interval h.T h u s
Var (y(t + h) − y(t)|y(t)) = hs∆2 ≡ hσ2,
30where σ2 = s∆2. Putting this together, we can represent the stochastic process for y
as
dy = −γydt+ σdx,
where for t>0, the expected value of x(t)g i v e nx(0) is x(0) and the conditional
variance is t. This is similar to a Brownian motion, except that the innovations in x
are not Gaussian, since y is constrained to lie on a discrete grid.
Now suppose one changes the three parameters of the stochastic process, the step
size, arrival rate of shocks, and number of steps, from (∆,s,n)t o
∆
x ,x 2s,x2n

for any
x>0. It is easy to verify that this does not change either the autocorrelation parameter
γ = s/n or the instantaneous variance σ =
√
s∆. But as x →∞ , the distribution
of the innovation process x converges to a normal by the Central Limit Theorem.
Equivalently, y converges to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.22 This observation is also
useful for computation. It is possible to ﬁnd a solution on a coarse grid and then to
reﬁne the grid by increasing x without substantially changing the results.
C Derivation of the Wage Equation
Assume that wages are continually renegotiated, so the wage only depends on the cur-
rent aggregate state (p,δ). Eliminate current and future values of J from equation (16)
using equation (18)
wp,δ = p − (r + δ + s)(1 − β)Sp,δ + sEp,δ(1 − β)Sp ,δ .
Similarly, eliminate current and future values of S using (10):
wp,δ = p −
(r + δ + s)c
q(θp,δ)
+ sEp,δ
c
q(θp ,δ )
Finally, replace the last two terms using equation (9) to get equation (13).
22Notably, for large n it is extraordinarily unlikely that the state variable reaches its limiting values of
±n∆. The unconditional distribution of the state variable is approximately normal with mean zero and
standard deviation σ/
√
2γ =∆

n/2. The limiting values of the state variables therefore lie
√
2n standard
deviations above and below the mean. If n = 1000, as is the case in the simulations, one should expect to
observe such values approximately once in 10436 periods.
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34Summary Statistics, quarterly U.S. data, 1951 to 2001
puvv
u
Mean — 0.0567 — —
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.018 0.188 0.183 0.349
Autocorrelation (1 Quarter) 0.866 0.918 0.930 0.936
p 1 -0.399 0.399 0.395
u — 1 -0.896 -0.949
Correlation Matrix v — — 1 0.951
v
u ——— 1
Table 1: Average labor productivity p is real average output per hour in the non-farm
business sector, constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the National
Income and Product Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics. The unemployment
rate u is constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey. The help-wanted
advertising index v is constructed by the Conference Board. Both u and v are quarterly
averages of seasonally adjusted monthly series. Unemployment, vacancies, and productivity
are expressed as ratios to an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. The coeﬃcient of
variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
35Source of Shocks
Parameter Productivity Job Destruction
productivity p stochastic 1
job destruction rate δ 0.1 stochastic
discount rate r 0.012 0.012
value of leisure z 0.4 0.4
matching function m(u,v) 1.7
√
uv 1.7
√
uv
bargaining power β 0.5 0.5
cost of vacancy c 0.54 0.54
standard deviation σ 0.161 0.076
autoregressive parameter γ 0.080 0.080
Table 2: Parameter values in simulations of the dynamic stochastic model. The text provides
details on the stochastic process for productivity and for the job destruction rate.
36Productivity Shocks
p uvθ
Mean 1.050 0.0568 0.0564 1.071
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.260 0.189 0.229 0.428
Autocorrelation (1 quarter) 0.917 0.959 0.844 0.917
p 1 -0.904 0.976 1.000
Correlation Matrix u — 1 -0.898 -0.901
v — — 1 0.975
θ — —— 1
Job Destruction Shocks
δ uvθ
Mean 0.102 0.0571 0.0557 0.979
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.192 0.186 0.165 0.0219
Autocorrelation (1 quarter) 0.922 0.958 0.957 0.922
δ 1 0.978 0.971 -1.000
Correlation Matrix u — 1 0.999 -0.978
v — — 1 -0.972
θ — —— 1
Table 3: Results from simulating the dynamic stochastic model. The text provides details
on the stochastic process for productivity and for the job destruction rate. The coeﬃcient
of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
37Quarterly U.S. Unemployment Rate and Trend, 1951–2001
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Figure 1: The unemployment rate is a quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly
series constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population
Survey, survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. The trend is an HP ﬁlter of the
quarterly data with smoothing parameter 105.
38Quarterly U.S. Help Wanted Advertising Index and Trend, 1951–2001
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Figure 2: The help-wanted advertising index is a quarterly average of the seasonally ad-
justed monthly series constructed by the Conference Board with normalization 1987 = 100.
The data were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/employ/helpwant. The trend is an HP ﬁl-
ter of the quarterly data with smoothing parameter 105.
39Quarterly U.S. Beveridge Curve, 1951–2001
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Figure 3: The unemployment rate is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
from the Current Population Survey. The help-wanted advertising index is constructed by
the Conference Board. Both are quarterly averages of seasonally adjusted monthly series
and are expressed as ratios to an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105.
40Quarterly U.S. Average Labor Productivity and Trend, 1951–2001
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Figure 4: Real output per hour in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Major Sector Productivity and Costs program, survey home page
http://www.bls.gov/lpc/, 1992 = 100. The trend is an HP ﬁlter of the quarterly data
with smoothing parameter 105.
41Quarterly U.S. Vacancy-Unemployment Ratio and Average Labor Productivity, 1951–2001
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Figure 5: The unemployment rate is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
from the Current Population Survey. The help-wanted advertising index is constructed by the
Conference Board. Both are quarterly averages of seasonally adjusted monthly series. Labor
productivity is real average output per hour in the non-farm business sector, constructed
by the BLS from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Current Employment
Statistics. The vacancy-unemployment ratio and labor productivity are expressed as ratios
to an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105.
420
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
(p-z)/c (left scale) v/u (right scale)
beta = 0
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500 beta = 0.1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00
beta = 0.5
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00
beta = 0.99
Figure 6:
¯ p−z
c =
(β+(1−β)u)v
(1−β)(1−u)u f o rf o u rd i ﬀ e r e n tv a l u e so fβ (solid line, left scale) and v
u (dashed
line, right scale). The unemployment rate u is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) from the Current Population Survey. The help-wanted advertising index v is
constructed by the Conference Board. Both are quarterly averages of seasonally adjusted
monthly series.
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Figure 7: β =1− v
(1−u)(v+u
¯ p−z
c ) with
¯ p−z
c = 1282 (solid line, left scale) and v
u (dashed line,
right scale). The unemployment rate u is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
from the Current Population Survey. The help-wanted advertising index v is constructed by
the Conference Board. Both are quarterly averages of seasonally adjusted monthly series.
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